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week to two, and the lag between deposits
and required reserves is reduced from two
weeks to two days. Thus, during agiven
two-week "reserve maintenance period/"
which beginson aThursday and ends on the
second Wednesday, a bank's required
reserves will depend on its transaction
deposits in the two-week "reserve compu-
tation period" which ended on the pre-
ceding Monday. The two systems are
shown in the chart.
The new system applies only to the trans-
action (checkable) accounts in M 1: reserve
requirements against non-transaction
deposits will continue to be computed on
a lagged basis. The new lagged system will
differfrom the old, however, in that the
maintenance and computation periods are
bothtwoweeks in length, and the beginning
ofthe maintenance period lags the end of
the previous computation period by 17
days. This feature ofthe new reserve
accounting rules, together with the features
ofthe MCAdiscussed above, mean that the
entire reserve accountingsystem is now set
up to provide for aclose link between M1
and reserves, butonlyaweak linkbetween
the broader aggregates and reserves.
Operating procedures
The significance ofCRR for M 1 control wiII
depend on the Fed's so-called short-run
operating procedures. The Fed could
minimizethe importance ofCRR by using
the federal funds rate as atool forcontrolling
M 1, as itdid priorto October 1979. Under
this procedure, ifthe Fed wished, for
example, to lowerM1 growth, itwould raise
the federal funds rate in an attemptto reduce
the public's demand to hold M1 and to
induce banks to supply fewer deposits. This
reduction in M1 would lead toa reduction in
required reserves. Under LRR, reserves
would fall with a lag oftwo weeks, whereas
under CRR they would fall contemporane-
ously. However, this difference would have
Regulations on reserves
Underthe MonetaryControl Actof 1980
(MCA), all deposit-taking institutions-
commercial and savings banks, savings and
loan associations and credit unions-are
required to hold reserves equal to specified
proportionsofcertain categories oftheir
outstandingdeposits. When the MCA is fully
phased in (the phase-in has been completed
for all but nonmember institutions), most
transaction (checkable) deposits in M 1 will
carry reserve requirements of 12 percent,
and the non-personal time, savings and
money market deposit accounts in M2 and
M3 will have 3 percent requirements. All
other deposits in M2 and M3 are free of
reserve requirements.
Lagged reserve accounting was introduced
in 1968. In agiven statement week, LRR
meant that the level ofreserves which an
institution was required to hold depended
on its deposits outstandingtwo weeks
earlier. Underthe newCRR system, the
statement period is lengthened from one
Ending the lag
Last month, the long-debated switch from
lagged reserve accounting (LRR) to contem-
poraneous reserve accounting (CRR) took
place. This arcane subject has been a major
"bone" ofcontention among monetary
economists and policymakers for the last
fifteen years. One side has argued that
implementingCRR is essential ifthe Federal
Reserve is to have close control overthe
monetary aggregates, and that such control
is necessary ifmonetary policies are to be
effective. Others have asserted that this
regulatory change would have little, ifany,
appreciable effect on monetary control, and
thatclose short-run monetarycontrolwould
be undesirable. The purpose ofthis Letter is
to describe the main features ofCRR and
howthe change in rules is likely to alterthe
Federal Reserve's methods for controlling
money in the short-run, and thereby affect
interest rates and the economy.
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no significance for monetary control
because changes in reserves would merely
be incidental by-products ofmonetary
control, notthe causal factor.
Alternatively, the Fed maychoose to control
M1through areserve aggregate. In this case,
the choice between lagged and contempor-
aneous accountingcould become an impor-
tant monetary policy issue. The link
between reserves and M 1 depends very
much on reserve requirements. With a
twelve percent reserve requirement, for
example, every $100 change in deposits is
associated with a $12 change inrequired
reserves. Thus, ifthe Fed reduces the
quantity oftotal reserves available to the
banking system; total bankdeposits must
fall.
Since the link between required reserves
and deposits is contemporaneous under
CRR, the Fed can use total reserves as a
means ofcontrolling M1. This is because,
with CRR, banks as a group influence their
current period's required reserves through
changes in currentdeposits. Thus, the Fed
can provideafixed quantityoftotal reserves
and force the banking system to adjust its
current deposits and, thereby, required
reserves, accordingly. Under LRR, this
approach is not feasible because the link
between current deposits and required
reserves. is broken. Banks enter any given
week with'a predetermined or unchange-
able quantity of required reserves. Unless
the Fed wanted to force the banking system
into a deficiency, it had to provide the
quantity of reserves demanded by the bank-
ing system. This meant that the Fed was
effectively prevented from controlling the
money stock by changing total reserves.
Some critics ofthe Fed have argued that the
inability to use total reserves was a major
disadvantage ofLRR. They asserted that if
the Fed wanted to use reserves to control
M 1, as itdid afterOctober1979, ithad todo
so through a less direct and inferior linkage.
To use a reserves approach under LRR, the
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Fed hadtoinfi'uence the stock ofmoney by
varying the share oftotal reserves which it
provided to banks through the discount
window, that is, by altering the ratio of
borrowed to nonborrowed reserves. Ifthe
Fed wished to slow M 1 growth, it sold
governmentsecuriti"es to reduce the supply
of nonbQrrowed reserves. With no change
in the (predetermined) level of required
reserves, this meant that borrowed reserves
had to rise. Banks are reluctant to borrow
from the discountwindow, however, since
they are discouraged from doing so through
administrative pressures when othersources
offunds are reasonably available. Thus,
when the Fed reduced the supply ofnon-
borrowedreserves, banks would first try to
meet deficiencies through the federal funds
market. Theresultant increase inthe funds
rate relative to the discount rate notonly
induced banks to borrow from the Fed but
also slowed M1 growth, as the public's
demand to hold M 1 decelerated.
This nonborrowed reserves method also
could be applied underCRR. Even under
this indirect approach, CRR has an advan-
tage overthe lagged rules. UnderCRR,
unexpected changes in the public'sdemand
to hold M1 cause a quicker interest rate
response, which helps bring Ml back to
target morequickly. Assume forthe moment
that the public's demand formoney in-
creases. This causes an immediate increase
in required reserves underCRR. Ifthe Fed
holds nonborrowed reserves constant, the
added demand for reserves causes an imme-
diate and automatic rise in the funds rate so
that the unexpected growth in M 1 is slowed
more quickly.
Under LRR, the funds rate increase took two
weeks because required reserves lagged
behind deposits by that length oftime. The
delay ofany offsetting interest rate move-
ments was a disadvantage because it
allowed deviations ofMl from target to
persist longer. A two week speed-up in
response is important for close monthly
control, but opinions differ as to its impor-tance for controllingM 1 on a quarterly or
longer basis.
Policy debate
The abilityafforded byCRR to use atotal
reserves operating procedure as well as
CRR's faster interest rate responses are
viewed as majoradvantages by some
economists. They argue that volatility in the
growthofthemonetaryaggregates has ledto
cyclical movements in the economy, and
that the resu ltingeconomicuncertainty has
raised real (inflation-adjusted) interest rates.
They see CRR as a way to lessen the disrup-
tive influenceofvolatile money growth.
Othereconomists disagree. They argue that
close short-run M 1 control wouId require
extreme volatility in interest rates in the
short-run, and thatthiswould bedetrimental
to the performance ofthe economy because
itwould disruptfinancial flows. They also
argue that it makes Iittle sense to control
money precisely because money's relation-
ship with economic activity frequently
changes (possibly because offinancial
innovation and deregulation).
It appears unlikely that the experience of
the nearfuturewill resolve these arguments.
The current contemporaneous reserve
requirement rules may helpthe Fed to
control M 1, butthey provide no great
advantage in controlling thebroaderaggre-
gates. However, since October 1982,the
Fed has given less policyweight to M 1 in
favor ofM2 and M3 as intermediate targets
ofmonetary policy. The importanceofthe
broader aggregates was confirmed in the
Fed's recent Monetary Policy Report to
Congress.
The main concern ofthe Fed appears to be
thatthe introductionofNOWandothernew
accounts in recent years may have changed
the behaviorofM1 significantlyenough to
make its relationship with GNP less reliable.
than itonce was. The Monetary Policy
Report states that "whilethere is evidence
ofmore normal and predictable patterns
reappearing, the(Federal Open Market)
Committee felt that more time would be
required for assessing the impactofstruc-
tural changes on public and institutional
behaviorbefore full orprimaryweightcould
be placed on Ml as a policy guide." Dis-
cussing CRR, the Report argued that the
choiceofoperatingprocedures" ...does not
dependon the technical characteristics of
the reserve requirement system in place but
rather on broaderpolicy judgments about
the relativeweighttobegiven M1 as atarget
and the desirabilityofseeking close short-
run control ofthat aggregate." As a result, it
decided notto make any substantial change
in currentoperatingprocedures at this time.
eRR th!JS wiII have little effecton monetary
policy in the immediate future.
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Loans, Leases and Investments1 2 176,216 - 475 190 .5
Loans and Leases1 6 155,933 - 465 578 1.6
Commercial and Industrial 46,511 - 104 548 5.0
Real estate 59,349 72 450 3.2
Loans to Individuals 26,990 42 339 5.3
Leases 5,005 - 5 - 56 - 4.7
U.S. Treasury and Agency Securities2 12,190 5 - 316 - 10.6
OtherSecurities2 8,092 - 15 - 70 - 3.6
Total Deposits 185,745 83 - 5,251 - 11.5
Demand Deposits 43,509 181 - 5,727 - 48.8
Demand Deposits Adjusted3 29,294 228 - 2,037 - 27.3
OtherTransaction Balances4 12,278 - 189 - 496 - 16.3
Total Non-Transaction Balanc;es6 129,958 91 973 3.2
MoneyMarket Deposit
Accounts-Total 40,495 - 29 898 9.5
Time Deposits in Amounts of
$100,000or more 38,005 31 - 159 - 1.8
Other Liabilities for Borrowed MoneyS 18,771 - 555 - 4,235 - 77.2
Weekly Averages
of Daily Figures
Reserve Position, All Reporting Banks
Excess Reserves (+l/Deficiency (~)
Borrowings
















1 Includes loss reserves, unearned income, excludes interbank loans
2 Excludes trading account securities
3 Excludes U.S. government and depository institution deposits and cash items
4 ATS, NOW, Super NOWand savings accounts with telephone transfers
5 Includes borrowingvia FRB, IT&L notes, Fed Funds, RPs and other sources
6 Includes items not shown separately
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